I finished a late night visit to a morgue in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in March, 2003, where I was working at the U.S. consulate. For months, the U.S. and its allies had prepared for a war with Iraq, two countries to the north of us. Meanwhile, a lone terrorist had killed an American working in Dhahran, and his identity must be verified to notify next of kin. After my return to the consulate, I phoned the victim’s boss to brief him. He informed me that the air war with Iraq had begun with the bombing of Baghdad. Utterly exhausted, I stood in the desert breeze and hoped the campaign was going to be over with as quickly as the first Gulf war over a decade before.

This one was to be, so we were told, a brief campaign of shock and awe, after which we would conquer Iraq and be greeted as liberators. The war lasted over eight years, and by then, Americans had become increasingly unpopular in Iraq and most of the Middle East.

The current proposal to destroy ISIS appears more realistic. No optimistic blitz. It is anticipated to last beyond the tenure of our current president. Ground fighting will be left to local armies, not U.S. combat forces. Syria, where the conflict began, will be included in the campaign.

Kenneth M. Pollack, at the Brookings Institution, also presented a more sober assessment of any conflict which intends to ultimately defeat Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian dictator’s brutal tactics led to the current situation. Pollack’s observations are found in the September/October 2014 issue of Foreign Affairs. He proposes American support of a new Syrian army and political structure. It not only would defeat Assad but support the aftermath with the establishment of “a functional, egalitarian system of government.”

If carried out, a big “if” as Pollack realizes, it would overcome the peace that so defeats us in these wars: “a victory by one side, followed by a horrific slaughter of its adversaries . . .”

Do we have enough patience to act as midwife to such a slow birthing?